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ABSTRACT

THE INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION AS AN AUDITOR PERSUASION TACTIC
BY
KERRI-ANN GOODEN-SANDERSON
AUGUST 2014

Committee Chair:

Dr. Jennifer Joe

Major Academic Unit:

School of Accounting

This study examines how reliance on the client’s internal audit function (IAF) affects
auditors’ ability to persuade management to accept material weakness assessments of
detected internal control deficiencies. I further investigate whether auditors’ ability to
persuade management to accept material weakness assessments depends on the
subjectivity the control deficiency assessment to varied interpretations (ambiguity). I
apply group affiliation and persuasion theories to hypothesize that management will have
higher group identification with the IAF than with the auditors. I predict that
management’s group affiliation will lead them to be more accepting of auditors’ internal
control assessments when the auditors rely on the client’s IAF than when auditors do not.
Further, I hypothesize that the greater the ambiguity in the internal control deficiency
assessment, the more persuaded management will be to accept the auditors’ control
assessment in situations where the auditors rely on the IAF than when the auditors do not.
I conduct an experiment using a 2 X 2 between-subjects design in which I manipulate
auditors’ reliance on the client’s IAF during tests of the client’s internal controls (rely or
not rely) and the level of ambiguity in the internal control deficiency assessment (less
ambiguous or more ambiguous) in a SOX 404 Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting
(ICFR) audit setting. The study’s findings provide evidence that relying on the client’s
IAF can improve auditors’ likelihood of persuading the client when control assessments
are more open to varied interpretations. This study sheds light on a previously ignored
benefit of using the client’s IAF – as a persuasion tactic. Thus, my research contributes
to two literature streams: factors influencing auditor-client negotiations and the effects of
using the IAF on audit engagements. These results provide both practical and theoretical
insights to academics, practitioners and auditing standard setters.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Auditors and clients regularly engage in negotiations during the financial statement
reporting process (Gibbins et al. 2001) and the results of these negotiations are reflected in the
final product - audited financial statements (e.g., Brown and Wright 2008). Consequently, the
content of audited financial statements can be considered to be a result of the joint efforts of
company management and their auditors (Antle and Nalebuff 1991).1
While auditors and management engage in discussions and negotiations to resolve
proposed financial statement adjustments (e.g., Gibbins et al. 2001, Hatfield et al. 2010), it is
likely that they also engage in such negotiations to resolve differences in classifications of
detected internal control deficiencies that affect the Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting
(ICFR) audit opinion. The severity of the control deficiency2 is determined by the potential for a
misstatement to be material and the likelihood that the misstatement would not be
detected/prevented. The most severe deficiency, material weakness, is a deficiency in internal
controls where there is a “reasonable possibility” that a “material” misstatement in the
company’s financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis (PCAOB
2007). Material weaknesses that are not remediated by year-end result in the auditors issuing an
adverse opinion on the effectiveness of that company’s internal controls over financial reporting.
These criteria defining the classification of internal control deficiencies can be complex and
ambiguous (Bedard and Graham 2011; Asare and Wright 2012) and likely lead to contentious
discussions and negotiations between auditors and management especially when an adverse
1

In addition to an opinion on the presentation of the client’s financial statements, auditors also render an opinion on
the effectiveness of the client’s internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR; PCAOB 2007).
2
According to Auditing Standard No. 5 (PCAOB 2007), auditors assess a company’s internal controls over financial
reporting as either operating effectively or as being deficient. There are three categorizations for deficient controls,
listed from least to most severe: (1) control deficiency, (2) significant deficiency, or (3) material weakness. Unlike
the other classifications, material weaknesses are disclosed to the public in the form of an adverse ICFR audit
opinion.
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ICFR opinion is at issue.3 Research finds that auditors’ ICFR assessments are important because
adverse opinions can have negative ramifications for companies and management in the form of
lower share prices (Hammersley et al. 2008), increased costs of capital (Ashbough-Skaife et al.
2009), and higher management turnover (Johnstone et al. 2011).
This study investigates how reliance on the client’s internal audit function (IAF) affects
auditors’4 ability to persuade management to accept material weakness assessments of detected
internal control deficiencies. I examine whether the persuasive effects of IAF use is conditional
upon the degree of ambiguity associated with the classification of internal control deficiencies
under Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5; PCAOB 2007). Prior studies that investigate auditor-client
negotiations primarily focus on financial statement adjustment settings (e.g., Hatfield et al. 2008,
Sanchez et al. 2007; Ng and Tan 2003). In a financial statement context, the emphasis of
negotiations is on reconciling differences in auditor evaluations of past economic transactions
(and related valuations) with those of management to ensure that financial statements are not
materially misstated in actuality. On the other hand, in an ICFR audit, auditors evaluate the
client’s internal controls over financial reporting to opine on whether controls are operating
effectively (i.e., whether the internal controls could reasonably be expected to prevent or detect a
material misstatement in the financial statements).5 In this way, the ICFR context provides a
different and important setting in which to investigate auditor-client negotiations. An ICFR audit
setting involves a predictive (or forward-looking) judgment about the potential occurrence of
undetected misstatements as opposed to a judgment about an actual misstatement occurrence
3

Anecdotal evidence gathered through conversations with practicing auditors and senior accounting executives
confirm that discussions and negotiations between auditors and management can become heated and contentious
especially when related to issues about internal control deficiencies that are classified as material weaknesses by the
auditors.
4
To avoid confusion between internal and external auditors I use the term “auditor(s)” throughout this paper to refer
to the client’s external auditors. Internal auditors are referred to as the IAF.
5
Auditing standards indicate that a material weakness in internal controls can exist even when financial statements
are not materially misstated (Auditing Standard No. 5; PCAOB 2007).
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based on past events as is the case in the financial statement audit setting. In addition, the
assessment of the client’s internal controls affects the nature and extent of subsequent
substantive testing planned for the financial statement audit. In this light, and also considering
that there is limited prior research investigating auditor-client negotiations in the ICFR audit
setting, my study is important and contributes to the initial academic dialogue on ICFR
negotiations.
Research finds that relying on the client’s IAF can benefit the audit process by reducing
the amount of testing directly performed by the auditors resulting in cost savings and increased
audit efficiency measured by reduced audit delays (e.g., Felix et al. 2001; Pizzini et al. 2012;
Abbott et al. 2012b). Prior studies on auditor-client negotiations have examined the effects of
auditor persuasion strategies such as the general negotiation approach (e.g., Honglin et al. 2011;
Gibbins et al. 2010), reciprocity (e.g., Hatfield et al. 2008; Bame-Aldred and Kida 2007; Sanchez
et al. 2007), and auditor concessions (Ng and Tan 2003) on auditor-client negotiations. This
study contributes to the internal audit reliance and client negotiation literatures by examining a
previously unexplored benefit of relying on the client’s IAF – as a useful persuasion tactic to
convince management to acknowledge adverse internal control deficiencies which require public
disclosure in the auditors’ report.
Group affiliation and persuasion theories suggest that individuals have higher
identification with groups with which they are affiliated (an in-group) and are more persuaded by
messages received from in-group sources than by messages received from out-group sources
(e.g., Mackie et al. 1992). Additionally, when the message involves the evaluation of more
ambiguous cues, the persuasion effects of the in-group source is further enhanced because the
individual relies more on heuristic cues (e.g., the message source) to interpret the message
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(Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994; Hafer et al. 1996). Applying these theories, I hypothesize that
management will have higher identification with the IAF than with auditors, and will be more
persuaded to accept auditors’ control assessments when auditors rely on the IAF than when
auditors do not. Additionally, I hypothesize that the ambiguity of the control deficiency
assessment moderates auditors’ ability to persuade management. That is, when the judgment
involved in assessing the internal control deficiency is more open to different interpretations,
auditors will more likely persuade management when they rely versus do not rely on the IAF.
Using a SOX 404 ICFR audit setting, I conduct an experiment in which I manipulate: (1)
auditors’ reliance on the client’s IAF during tests of the client’s internal controls (rely or not
rely), and (2) the degree of ambiguity in the internal control deficiency assessment (less
ambiguous or more ambiguous). I use an ICFR setting because prior research finds that the
consequences of receiving an adverse internal control assessment have severe implications for
the company and its management (e.g., Hammersley et al. 2008; Ashbough-Skaife et al. 2009;
Johnstone et al. 2011). I use management’s willingness to accept the auditors’ adverse internal
control assessment as a measure of auditors’ ability to persuade management. To capture
management’s identification with the internal and external auditors, I use an adapted
organization identification scale (Bamber and Iyer 2007) to measure participants’ group
identification with both the IAF and the auditors (within-subjects). Using a sample of accounting
professionals with experience performing internal controls assessments, I find that management
has higher identification with their IAF than they do with auditors and that management
perceives control testing results to be more credible when auditors rely versus do not rely on the
IAF. Consistent with my prediction, I also find that when the control assessment is more open to
interpretation, management is more persuaded to accept an adverse control assessment when
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auditors rely on the client’s IAF. However, evidence suggests that these persuasive effects
disappear when the control assessment is less open to interpretation. In fact, in such settings,
relying on the client’s IAF may be to the auditors’ disadvantage when trying to persuade
management to accept an adverse ICFR opinion.
Understanding factors that improve auditors’ likelihood of persuading the client has
theoretical and practical implications for academics, practitioners, and accounting standard
setters. This study extends the literature and informs the audit practice by examining how using
the client’s IAF on the ICFR audit can influence management to disclose material weaknesses.
Using an archival approach, Lin et al. (2011) find that companies are more likely to disclose
material weakness control deficiencies when auditors coordinate audit activities with the client’s
IAF.6 In their “IAF coordination” variable, Lin et al. (2011) include activities such as loaning
IAF staff to the auditors, the IAF performing complete or partial audits of locations/functions,
conducting joint annual planning sessions with the IAF, as well as conducting joint risk/control
sessions with the IAF. By examining the effects of these IAF coordination activities as a single
composite variable, Lin et al.’s (2011) study does not specifically disentangle which of these
activities influence companies to increase disclosures of material weaknesses nor does the study
examine how these activities effect greater disclosure. My study extends Lin et al. (2011) by
investigating how using the client’s IAF in the capacity of direct assistants on the audit can
increase the persuasiveness of audit findings that influence management to disclose material
weaknesses. I also examine control deficiency contexts within which such persuasion may be
effective. Beyond the findings of Lin et al. (2011), this study provides evidence that the
persuasive effects of coordinating audit testing activities with the client’s IAF is conditional
6

Lin et al. (2011) uses a single composite measure of auditor-IAF coordination which includes several different
activities. In their study, the indicator variable is coded as “1” if the auditor engages in any of these activities with
the client’s IAF, “0” otherwise.
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upon the nature of the control deficiency at issue. That is, when the assessment of the control
deficiency is more open to interpretation, management is more persuaded by the auditors’
message when auditors rely on the IAF for direct assistance. However, these persuasive effects
dissipate when the assessment of the control deficiency is less open to interpretation.
Auditing standards (e.g., Auditing Standard No. 5, Public Company Auditing Oversight
Board [PCAOB] 2007) provide guidance regarding auditors’ use of the client’s IAF during
financial statement audits especially on ICFR audits. This study can provide further insights to
standard setters as they prescribe how and in what contexts auditors can utilize the client’s IAF
during the financial statement assurance process.
In the next sections of the paper, I discuss the relevant literature and develop my
hypotheses, followed by a discussion of the investigation method. I then discuss my findings
and implications.
II. BACKGROUND LITERATURE
2.1 Auditor Negotiation with the Client
Although company management is responsible for the content and presentation of the
financial statements, the end product can be thought of as resulting from the joint efforts of
auditors and management (Antle and Nalebuff 1991). In a survey study, Gibbins et al. (2001)
report that 67 percent of audit partners have entered into negotiations regarding adjustments to
the financial statements with more than half of their clients. This evidence indicates that auditorclient negotiations are common and play an important role in the audit process as well as in the
broader auditor-client relationship.
Earlier studies on auditor-client negotiations provide practical and descriptive evidence to
promote our understanding of the experiences and incentives of the negotiating parties (e.g.,
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Gibbins et al. 2001; Gibbins et al. 2005, 2007). Subsequent studies further examine the auditorclient negotiation process and find that the process is influenced by several factors including
engagement risk and auditor experience (Johnstone et al. 2002; Brown and Johnstone 2009 ); the
effects of past client relationship as well as audit committee strength and effectiveness or
existence of authoritative guidance (Ng and Tan 2003; Brown and Wright 2011); and the
magnitude of audit differences and prior client concessions (Hatfield et al. 2010). This study
aims to extend the literature by investigating how coordinating audit activities with the client’s
IAF can also be a factor that influences the auditor-client negotiation process.
Prior studies that investigate auditor-client negotiations primarily focus on financial
statement adjustment settings (e.g., Hatfield et al. 2008, Sanchez et al. 2007; Ng and Tan 2003).
This paper aims to extend the current literature to provide evidence of how the client’s IAF could
be used as an auditor persuasion tactic in an ICFR audit setting.7 In an ICFR context, auditors
evaluate the client’s internal controls over financial reporting and opine on whether these
controls are operating effectively so as to prevent (or detect) a material misstatement in the
financial statements.8 As such, the ICFR context involves a predictive judgment about the
potential occurrence of a misstatement rather than an actual misstatement judgment based on
past events as is the case in the financial statement audit setting. In this way, the predictive
judgment involved in ICFR evaluations may be based on comparatively less objective evidence
of a misstatement than judgments regarding an actual financial statement misstatement. Bedard
and Graham (2011) find that in the absence of objective evidence of a misstatement, the
evaluation of the severity of control deficiencies is a more complex and nuanced judgment

7

There is a paucity of research of auditor-client negotiations in an ICFR context. Most studies focus on the financial
statement adjustment setting (e.g., Hatfield et al. 2008, Sanchez et al. 2007; Ng and Tan 2003).
8
Auditing standards indicate that a material weakness in internal controls may exist even when financial statements
are not materially misstated (Auditing Standard No. 5 2007).
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process. Given that internal control deficiency judgments are based on less objective evidence
and considering that adverse ICFR opinions can have negative implications for companies and
management,9 auditors likely face a contentious ICFR negotiation process with management
especially when presented with an adverse internal control deficiency opinion. Therefore,
examining auditor negotiation strategies in an ICFR audit context is important to the practice and
the accounting literature because of the relative complexities involved in evaluating internal
control deficiencies and convincing management to disclose severe deficiencies (Bedard and
Graham 2011).
Prior studies that have investigated the effects of governance factors on the auditor-client
negotiation process have mainly focused on the audit committee (e.g., Ng and Tan 2003; Brown
and Wright 2011). These findings suggest that audit committee strength affects auditors’
perceived bargaining power and that this governance factor influences their pre-negotiation
planning judgments and negotiation strategies. This study aims to extend the prior corporate
governance literature by examining the effects of another corporate governance factor on the
auditor-client negotiation process – the client’s IAF.
2.2 Auditor Reliance on Internal Auditors
Responding to critics following the issuance of Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS2; PCAOB
2004), the PCAOB announced that the inspection process would have an increased focus on
efficiency rather than mainly effectiveness (PCAOB 2006). Under their revised approach, the
inspection process would evaluate whether auditors relied on the client’s internal audit function
(IAF) to the level permitted in AS2 (PCAOB 2006). AS2 was subsequently amended to
Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5; PCAOB 2007) which calls for auditors to employ a top-down
9

The consequences of receiving an adverse internal control assessment could have severe implications for the
company and its management. For example, disclosures of “material weaknesses” have been associated with lower
share prices (Hammersley et al. 2008) and increased costs of capital (Ashbough-Skaife et al. 2009).

8

risk-based approach that includes increased utilization of the IAF depending on the risk
associated with the control being tested. AS5 prescribes that the auditor may utilize the client’s
IAF when performing tests related to the financial statement and ICFR audits. The PCAOB
emphasized that using a client’s IAF on these audits may increase audit efficiency (PCAOB
2007). In support of the PCAOB’s position, Abbott et al. (2012b) find that utilizing the client’s
IAF results in cost savings as well as increased audit efficiency.
Before relying on the client’s IAF, the auditors must first assess the relevancy of the
client’s IAF activities to the financial statement and/or ICFR audit process and whether
efficiencies can be gained by utilizing the IAF. If the IAF activities are deemed relevant and
beneficial to the audit process, the auditors must then evaluate the quality of the IAF before
engagement. Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 65 (AICPA 1991) requires the auditor
to assess the quality of the client’s IAF using three criteria: competence, objectivity, and quality
of the work performed.10 In cases where the IAF is found to be of sufficient quality, the auditor
should then evaluate the nature and extent of any reliance that will be placed on the IAF’s work
(e.g., Pizzini et al. 2012). Auditors may rely on IAF testing related to internal controls
evaluation, as well as those related to substantive testing depending on the nature of the risk
involved (PCAOB 2007).
Prior literature focuses largely on how the factors outlined in SAS No. 65, as well as
other client characteristics impact auditors’ decisions to rely on the IAF’s work (e.g., Maletta
1993; Maletta and Kida 1993; Felix et al. 2005; Munro and Stewart 2010; Pizzini et al. 2012;
Abbott et al. 2012a).11 Primarily, these studies examine how IAF quality characteristics and
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The three primary IAF quality characteristics are competence (e.g., educational level, certification), objectivity
(e.g., reporting relationship, party responsible for IAF employment decisions), and quality of work performance
(e.g., adequacy of audit programs, scope of work performed) (AICPA 1991).
11
See Bame-Aldred et al. (2013) for a review of external auditor reliance on the IAF.
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other governance factors affect auditors’ reliance decision in the financial statement audit
environment. This study extends the literature by examining the effects of reliance on the IAF in
an ICFR context and the resulting effects on the auditor-client negotiation process.
In an archival setting, Lin et al. (2011) find that companies have greater disclosure of
material weaknesses when auditors coordinate audit activities with the IAF. In their study, Lin et
al. (2011) aggregate several different methods through which auditors coordinate audit activities
with the IAF into a single variable. The “coordination” variable, includes any of the following
activities: “loaning IAF staff to the external auditors; performing complete or partial audits of
specific locations, products, or functions; conducting joint annual planning sessions; and
conducting joint risk or control sessions” (p. 301). Since “coordination” with the IAF is
considered to occur if any one or all of these activities occur, the study does not disentangle how
or which of these variables affect material weakness disclosures (e.g., whether coordination with
the client’s IAF allows auditors to identify more control deficiencies, better evaluate identified
deficiencies, or better persuade management to disclose deficiencies, etc.). Beyond the benefits
of coordinating audit activities with the IAF, I investigate whether auditors’ direct engagement
of the client’s IAF increases the credibility of internal control testing results and increases
management’s willingness to accept an adverse internal control opinion. By auditors providing a
more persuasive message, management may be more likely to make material weakness
disclosures when auditors engage the IAF as direct assistants in audit testing.
III. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
3.1 Persuasion: In-Group versus Out-Group
Membership in social groups is an important aspect of the individual members’ selfconcept (Brewer 1991; Triandis 1989) that significantly affects the likelihood that the individual
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will be persuaded by information cues (e.g., Mackie et al. 1992; Mackie et al. 1990). Mackie et
al. (1992) and Mackie et al. (1990) find that people are more persuaded by messages received
from in-group sources than out-group sources. These studies suggest that the significant
persuasion effect of in-group sources is due to group members using the information source as a
heuristic cue, as well as a systematic cue (to a lesser extent), to (1) accept the message and (2)
process the in-group members’ position.12 Accounting research finds that when in-group
identification is higher, auditors tend to be more lenient in resolving accounting issues with their
client (Bamber and Iyer 2007). Auditors are also less skeptical when reviewing work performed
by their own firm (Joe and Vandervelde 2007), and are more likely to do business with their
former audit firm than with other firms (Iyer et al. 1997).
Research suggests that management is likely to identify more with the IAF than they
would with the auditors i.e., on a hypothetical continuum, management would likely consider the
IAF to be more representative of in-group members than they would their auditors. This is the
case because the IAF is more integrated into an organization’s regular operations and activities.
For example, when performing operational and compliance audits, the IAF has opportunities to
develop relationships with management (Bou-Raad 2000) and the audit committee (Carcello et
al. 2005). Findings from Knippenberg and Schie (2000) suggest that these and other types of
interactions between internal auditors and management enhance group identification. Further,
Stefaniak et al. (2012) find that internal auditors have a greater level of identification with their
firm than auditors do (with the same firm). As a result, I expect that the reciprocal will occur.

12

Self-categorization theory, which suggests that the one’s concept of self fluctuates between personal and social
identities, is thought to provide an explanation for these underlying in-group persuasion effects (Turner et al. 1987).
When individuals’ social identity is more prominent in a given situation, they tend to focus more on their
membership with the social in-group and the similarities / characteristics they share with this group. In this way,
information pertaining to the in-group becomes part of the person’s self-concept (Smith and Henry 1996).
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Specifically, I anticipate that a company’s management will have greater in-group affiliation
with the IAF than they will with the auditors. This leads to my first hypothesis:
H1:

Management will have higher group identification with the IAF than they will
with the auditors.

Perceived similarities with in-group members are thought to influence persuasion in one
of two ways. First, individuals might more readily accept an in-group member’s argument by
using the in-group’s status as a heuristic cue so that they are more likely to agree with “similar
others” (Allen and Wilder 1979). Second, messages from in-group sources might also be
perceived as coming from a more credible source thereby, making the message a more credible
one (Chaiken 1980). Therefore, in the context of auditor-client negotiations over ICFR
classifications I expect that management will likely find control testing results to be more
credible when their IAF participates in executing control testing and will be more persuaded to
accept resultant internal control assessments.
Further, considering that IAFs are more directly compensated by the client company and
could have greater incentive to bias their evaluations toward their employer (Dezoort et al.
2000), management may be more inclined to agree with an adverse control deficiency that
internal auditors find due to the perception that the IAF is more of an ally than the auditors.13
That is, managements’ underlying expectation that their IAF may be more biased against
assessing control weaknesses as severe, may lead management to give more consideration to
severe deficiencies identified by their IAF. Accordingly, I expect that when auditors rely on the
client’s IAF during internal controls testing, management’s in-group affiliation with the IAF will
make the auditors’ control assessments more persuasive. Therefore, management will be more
13

Notwithstanding, Stefaniak et al. (2012) find evidence that internal auditors are less lenient than external auditors
when evaluating their client firm’s control deficiencies. If management is aware of this effect, they may be less
likely to agree with internal auditor-aided assessments.
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persuaded to accept the auditors’ internal control assessment when the auditors rely on the
company’s IAF than when the auditors do not.14 This leads to my next hypothesis:
H2:

Management will be more persuaded by the auditors’ control assessments when
the auditors rely on the client’s IAF than when they do not.

3.2 Control Deficiency Evaluations
Evaluating control deficiencies using the definitions described in accounting standards is
a complex task involving significant judgment (Earley et al. 2008; Bedard and Graham 2011).
Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) defines a material weakness as a deficiency, or a combination of
deficiencies, where there is a reasonable possibility that a material financial statement
misstatement will not be timely prevented or detected15 (PCAOB 2007). From the AS5 control
deficiency definition, it is evident that material weakness evaluations contain two elements of
judgment: the magnitude of the misstatement (i.e., the misstatement must be evaluated as
material) as well as the likelihood that such a misstatement will not be prevented / detected in a
timely manner (i.e., the likelihood must be assessed at least as a “reasonable possibility”). I
propose that financial statement preparers and auditors have more experience evaluating
materiality than they do the likelihood of detection. Therefore, evaluating the integration of
magnitude and likelihood of a control weakness leading to a misstatement becomes a variably
complex judgment that can be interpreted differently.
Accounting standards place heavy emphasis on assessing materiality and have provided
significant guidance to financial statement preparers and auditors (e.g., AS No. 11, AS5). Prior
studies find that materiality is typically assessed in relation to the company’s income (e.g.,
14

In the event that an alternate argument presented in the popular press is true, if managers hold the view that IAFs
are ineffective (e.g., Coenen 2008; Cooper 2008), they will discount IAF findings and recommendations which will
limit the persuasiveness of message-sources that include the IAF. In this way, auditor reliance on the client’s IAF
might not provide any incremental persuasion.
15
In contrast, AS5 describes a significant deficiency as a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, that is less
severe than a material weakness but is nonetheless important to warrant management’s attention.
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Robinson and Fertuck 1985; Icerman and Hillison 1991; Wright and Wright 1997), is consistent
across audit firms (Messier et al. 2005), and that auditors’ and investors’ materiality judgments
are similar (Chewning et al. 1998). Thus, the task of evaluating materiality is considered to be a
regularly performed task and one in which financial statement preparers and auditors utilize a
general decision framework.
On the other hand, there is limited authoritative guidance and there is no commonly used
decision framework for assessing the likelihood that a control will detect or prevent a
misstatement in a timely manner. Accounting standards define the likelihood of an event
occurring using phrases such as “remote,” “reasonable possibility,” and “probable” (e.g., AS
No.5) without providing a comprehensive framework for how these phrases are to be interpreted
and applied in a practical context. Consequently, studies find that the criteria used for judging
misstatement likelihood is ambiguous in practice due to the difficulties in interpreting the related
probability phrases (e.g., Reimers 1992; Reimers et al. 1993; Amer et al. 1994; Brody et al.
2003; Doupnik and Rechter 2004; Asare and Wright 2012; Bedard and Graham 2011). These
studies suggest that interpreting probability phrases such as those defining a material weakness is
relatively more ambiguous and open to varied interpretations than assessing materiality due to
the lack of comprehensive authoritative guidance and a general framework. Therefore,
assessing the likelihood of detecting a misstatement is a comparatively more complex task
involving greater judgment and the evaluation of more ambiguous cues than that of assessing the
magnitude of a misstatement.
3.3 The Effects of Perceived Message Ambiguity and Group Affiliation on Persuasion
The ambiguity of the message cues likely impacts the ability of the message source to
effect persuasion. Psychological research finds that when message cues are more ambiguous,
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and are more open to varied interpretation, individuals rely on heuristic processing and are more
persuaded when the message is delivered by a more credible messenger (Chaiken and
Maheswaran 1994). However, when message cues are less ambiguous, source credibility has
limited impact on persuasion (Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994). These findings suggest that for
messages with more varied interpretations, individuals will rely more on the message source to
interpret the argument. Applying the results of Mackie et al. (1992), individuals will perceive ingroup members as having higher credibility than they will out-group messengers and therefore,
will be more persuaded by more ambiguous message cues delivered by in-group members.
Thus, sources with which management identifies more (i.e., the IAF) will be more persuasive
when the subject matter of the message is more subject to differential interpretation (i.e., more
ambiguous).
Given that management likely has a better framework and more resources for assessing
materiality than for assessing the likelihood of detecting a misstatement, they might find
judgments related to the likelihood of a misstatement to be more open to interpretation than
judgments related to materiality. In the context of a material weakness evaluation, I expect
where the magnitude of the misstatement is high and the likelihood of detection just marginally
meets the threshold of “reasonably possible,” management will find the evaluation of the control
assessment to be more ambiguous and open to varied interpretations due to their focus on the
likelihood of detection judgment. On the other hand, where the likelihood of detection is high
and the magnitude of the misstatement just marginally meets the threshold of “materiality,”
management will find the evaluation of the control assessment to be less ambiguous due to their
focus on the misstatement magnitude judgment (see Figure 1 and Figure 2).
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In keeping with effects of group affiliation in persuasion theories, I expect that the
ambiguity of the message cue will moderate the effects of group affiliation on message
persuasiveness in an assurance setting. That is, when management perceives the judgment to be
more open to interpretation (i.e., ambiguous), they will be more persuaded by messages from ingroup sources than by messages from out-group sources. Therefore, when the control deficiency
evaluation involves more ambiguous message cues (i.e., more open to interpretation), it is likely
that management will be more persuaded to accept the control assessment when the auditors rely
on the client’s IAF than when the auditors do not rely on this function for control testing. This
leads to my next hypothesis.
H3:

When the assessment of the control deficiency is more open to interpretation
(ambiguous), management will be more persuaded to accept the auditors’ control
assessment when the auditors rely on the client’s IAF than when the auditors do
not rely on the IAF.

Further, given the moderating effects of message cue ambiguity on persuasion, I expect
that the likelihood of persuasion will be greatest when the message is more ambiguous and the
message is communicated by an in-group source. That is, management will be more persuaded
by the auditors’ control assessment when the judgment is more open to interpretation (i.e.,
ambiguous) and the auditors rely on the client’s IAF than when the judgment involved with the
control assessment is less ambiguous. I expect this moderating effect of message source will
diminish when the message is less ambiguous (Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994).
Insert Figure 3 here
Insert Figure 4 here
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IV. METHOD
4.1 Participants
This study’s research question investigates the likelihood that auditors can persuade
management to accept a material weakness control assessment. As such, accounting
professionals who have responsibility over the ICFR audit, and who more frequently discuss
accounting related issues with auditors make up the target participant pool for this study.
Therefore, I obtain a convenience sample of accounting professionals who have experience
evaluating internal controls over financial reporting and discussing financial statement issues
with auditors to proxy my target participants and address the research questions.
I recruited participants from two state CPA societies located in the southeast US via their
respective membership online discussion groups.16 I also retained the services of an academic
research participant search firm with a participant pool spanning the US. Participants were
required to be accounting professionals with experience performing internal controls assessments
and discussing audit issues with auditors. Study materials were administered via the Internet
using Qualtrics and participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions (Wade and
Tingling 2005). There was no difference in the allocation of participants from these recruiting
sources across experimental conditions.17
One hundred and fifteen participants completed my experimental instrument.
Participants ranged from 21 to 72 years old, with the average age being 43 years old.
Approximately 70% of the participants were male and approximately 77% were CPAs. Seventyfour percent reported they had practiced public accounting (auditing). Of the participants who
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These states require members of their state CPA online groups to be registered CPAs with the state’s CPA
regulatory agency.
17
Using a chi-square test, there is no statistical difference in the allocation of participants from these two recruiting
sources across the four experimental conditions ( χ2 [3] = 0.40, p = 0.94 two-tailed).

17

practiced public accounting, the average time spent in this practice was nine years. Fifty percent
of the participants reported that they had internal auditing experience. Participants with internal
auditing experience reported an average of five years experience in the practice. Participants
reported having average experience of nine years assessing internal controls and nine years
discussing financial statement issues with auditors (see Table 1).
4.2 Experimental Design
To test my hypotheses, I conduct an experiment using a 2 X 2 between-subjects design in
which I manipulate the auditors’ reliance on the IAF for internal control testing (rely or not rely),
and the ambiguity of the control deficiency assessment (less ambiguous or more ambiguous).
Using an ICFR control assessment setting, I measure managers’ willingness to accept the
auditors’ control assessment as my dependent variable.
To develop the experimental instrument used in this study, I conducted pilot testing with
21 accounting professionals whose mean age was 43 and who had who spent an average of five
years in their current accounting role. Several participants were practicing controllers, CFOs,
and SOX compliance officers in their company. Pilot participants had an average of four years
experience performing internal controls assessments and discussing related issues with their
auditors. Feedback garnered from the pilot was used to refine the experimental instrument so as
to increase the salience of the manipulated variables, enhance the realism of the control
deficiency scenario, and improve the clarity of the dependent variable related questions.
4.3 Procedures
Participants read a hypothetical case about an ICFR audit engagement. I adapted the case
used in Stefaniak et al. (2012) and a material weakness scenario used in Appendix D of AS2
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(PCAOB 2004).18 In this study, participants assumed the role of the CFO for Tango Sierra
(Tango), a publicly-traded manufacturer of electronic equipment based in the United States. The
CFO has responsibility for preparing the company’s financial statements and disclosing material
weaknesses in internal controls. Tango has had consistent sales and income growth over the past
several years, has retained the same external auditors for the past five years, and has received
clean financial statement and ICFR opinions in prior audits. Participants were told that Tango
has an IAF that is regarded as being of a high quality. Many of the internal auditors hold
professional certifications (e.g., CPA, CIA) and are objective and competent in the auditing work
they do. Auditors and the IAF have direct access to the Tango’s Audit Committee. Participants
were also told that tests of internal controls for Sarbanes Oxley compliance reporting purposes
are not performed by Tango’s IAF, rather such tests are performed by a separate Controls
Testing department. Before describing the deficient control, the case provides participants with
the definition of a material weakness including references to materiality and likelihood as two
criteria specifically addressed in the definition provided in AS5.
The experimental instrument describes a scenario in which, at year-end, Tango’s auditors
perform control testing for the ICFR audit. Tango has a standard sales contract, but sales
personnel often modify the standard contract terms to grant unauthorized and unrecorded sales
discounts to customers without the knowledge of AR personnel. Since AR personnel are
unaware of the sales discounts, the entire sales amount is recorded as an outstanding balance on
the AR aging and results in sales and AR overstatements.
The case indicates that auditors perform ICFR testing by either using Tango’s IAF as
direct assistants (rely condition) or by using the auditors’ own staff (not rely condition) to carry
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The Securities and Exchange Commission published examples of material weakness control deficiency scenarios
with the publication of PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 2 (2004).
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out testing procedures. Based on the results of control testing, the auditors determine the
magnitude of the potential misstatement as well as the likelihood that the misstatement would not
be detected or prevented by the current controls. The description of these two factors form the
bases for the manipulation of judgment ambiguity in this experiment. That is, in the Less
Ambiguous condition, the case presents a scenario where the magnitude of the potential
misstatement is marginal at 4.5% of pretax income (i.e., greater than “significant” but on the
lower threshold of being material) and the likelihood that the misstatement is not
detected/prevented is greater than “remote” at 70% (i.e., clearly “reasonably possible;” see
Figure 2). Whereas, in the More Ambiguous condition, the case presents a scenario where the
magnitude of the potential misstatement is greater than “significant” at 6% of pretax income (i.e.,
clearly material) and the likelihood that the misstatement is not detected/prevented is marginal at
25% (i.e., greater than “remote” but on the lower threshold of being “reasonably possible;” see
Figure 2).19 To maintain the integrity of the experimental design, the control weakness meets the
definition of a material weakness in both ambiguity conditions.
Participants were then shown an excerpt of the auditors working papers with information
that reinforced the details presented in the case (see Appendix). Given that the control
deficiency was discovered at year-end (Tango does not have time to perform remediation) and
there are no compensating controls, the auditors assess the control deficiency as a material
weakness. After reading the case materials, participants answered questions regarding their
willingness to accept the auditors control assessment of material weakness. They also answered
questions relating to their identification with the IAF and the auditors as well as manipulation
check and demographic related questions.
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More details regarding the Ambiguity conditions is provided under the Independent Variables section of the
paper.
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4.4 Independent Variables
To manipulate the ambiguity of the control deficiency assessment, I use different
combinations of the two factors that interplay to define the severity of a control deficiency – (1)
the materiality of a potential misstatement, and (2) the likelihood that a misstatement is not
prevented / detected in the financial statements (AS5, PCAOB 2007; see Figure 1). For a control
deficiency to be defined as a “material weakness,” it must meet the following criteria: (1) the
potential misstatement must be material, and (2) the likelihood that the misstatement is not
prevented / detected must be at least “reasonably possible” (AS5, PCAOB 2007).
Prior studies find that auditors, management and financial statement users use the rule-ofthumb of four to five percent of pretax income to assess materiality (see Messier et al. 2005 for a
review). That is, misstatements with a magnitude lower than four percent of pretax income are
generally considered to be immaterial; while misstatements greater than five percent of pretax
income are generally considered to be material. I use this rule-of-thumb as the parameter to
design the less / more ambiguous control assessment conditions.
Regarding the likelihood of not detecting or preventing a misstatement, prior research
finds that the mean numerical probability threshold that corresponds to the transition from the
probability phrase “remote” to “reasonably possible” is 16% (i.e., 16% is the mean numerical
probability for the threshold between “remote” and “reasonably possible;” Harrison and
Tomassini 1989).20 I use this specification as a guide in designing the less / more ambiguous
control assessment conditions.
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Harrison and Tomassini (1989) used a sample of auditors to conduct their study. They also find an upper quartile
average of 25% and a lower quartile average of 10% for this remote / reasonably possible threshold. Reimers (1992)
finds there is agreement among auditors and MBA students on the numerical probability interpretation of probability
phrases e.g., remote, reasonably possible.
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As indicated in the prior literature, auditors and management alike have experience with
(and there are resources in accounting standards) interpreting the materiality and have developed
simple rules to aid in these determinations (Messier et al. 2005). As such, there is greater
consensus surrounding the interpretation of material misstatements. Whereas, practitioners have
limited frames of reference for processing the probability phrases used in control deficiency
definitions (Bedard and Graham 2011; Asare and Wright 2012). Therefore, in general, assessing
misstatement materiality is less open to varied interpretations (less ambiguous) than interpreting
the likelihood scenarios associated with not detecting a misstatement (see Figure 2). Against this
theoretical framework, I select a high numerical probability (70%) to reflect the likelihood that a
misstatement would not be prevented or detected and a marginal measure for the magnitude of
the potential misstatement (4.5% of pretax income) for the less ambiguous control deficiency
assessment condition. By using this configuration, the judgment of whether this deficiency
meets the definition of a material weakness is more focused on the “materiality” factor (i.e.,
whether the magnitude of this misstatement is material) since the assessment of whether the
“likelihood” factor meets the criteria for material weakness is more salient (see point “B” in
Figure 1). By increasing the salience of the “likelihood” factor as meeting the meeting the
material weakness criteria, participants’ attention is channeled towards assessing the
“materiality” factor which is on the margin in this condition. Determining whether the
marginally material misstatement meets the criteria of a material weakness is a relatively less
ambiguous determination for participants to make.
For the more ambiguous control deficiency assessment condition, I select a marginal
numerical probability (25%) to reflect the likelihood that a misstatement would not be prevented
or detected and a high measure for the magnitude of the potential misstatement (6% of pretax
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income). By using this configuration, the judgment of whether this deficiency meets the
definition of a material weakness is more focused on the “likelihood” factor (i.e., whether the
likelihood is at least “reasonably possible”) since the assessment of whether the “materiality”
factor meets the criteria for material weakness is more salient (see point “A” in Figure 1). In this
condition, the materiality of the misstatement is greater than the conventional rule-of-thumb
whereas, the “likelihood” of not detecting the misstatement is on the margin of “reasonably
possible.” By increasing the salience of the “materiality” factor meeting the criteria,
participants’ attention is channeled towards the “likelihood” factor. Making the determination of
whether the marginal “likelihood” factor meets the criteria for a material weakness is a relatively
more ambiguous determination for participants to make (Figure 2).
I consulted with three ex-Big Four financial statement auditors who confirmed that the
rule-of-thumb of four to five percent of pretax income is currently and widely used in practice by
auditors and management as a general guideline for materiality.21 These prior Big Four auditors
have extensive experience with assessing internal controls and confirmed that the likelihood
probabilities selected (i.e., 25% and 70%) were reasonable estimates for the intended
manipulation and experimental conditions.
To manipulate auditor reliance on the client’s IAF, in the hypothetical case, I indicate
whether or not the auditors received control testing assistance from the client’s IAF. That is,
control testing was performed by the IAF as direct assistants to the auditors (rely) or performed
by the auditors’ staff only (not rely).
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Each of the ex-auditors have over seven years of public accounting and internal controls experience in multinational and publicly traded companies. Two of the three ex-auditors consulted have significant public accounting
experience and currently hold leadership accounting roles at publicly traded companies (including Fortune 500
companies).
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4.5 Dependent Variable and Group Identification
After participants read the hypothetical experimental case and the auditors’ control
assessment, they rated their willingness to accept the auditors’ control assessment of “material
weakness.” This rating serves as the primary dependent variable and is measured on a sevenpoint scale with the first option being “Very Unwilling” and the seventh option being “Very
Willing.”22 Consistent with prior studies on auditor negotiations (e.g., Hatfield et al. 2008), I use
this measure of “willingness” to proxy participants’ control assessment persuasion, where a
higher willingness rating suggests that participants will be more persuaded to accept the auditors’
control assessment; and a lower “willingness” rating suggests that participants will be less
persuaded to accept the auditors’ control assessment.
Participants then completed an adapted version of Bamber and Iyer’s (2007)
Organizational Identification Scale. I modify the identification questions to measure participants’
within-subjects identification with Tango’s internal auditors and with Tango’s external auditors
(see Table 2 for the within-subjects identification questions). That is, I ask participants of their
agreement via five statements that measured their group identification with Tango’s IAF (while
still assuming their role as Tango’s CFO). I use a similar set of statements to measure
participants’ group identification with Tango’s auditors.23 I use a seven-point scale to measure
participants’ agreement with the statements (with the first option being “Strongly Disagree” and
the seventh option being “Strongly Agree”24). I compare the responses to these two sets of
statements to determine whether participants’ have a higher group identification with the IAF
than they do the auditors. The mean scores from each set of statements comprise management’s
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The response options were numerically coded such that “Very Unwilling” = 1 and “Very Willing” = 7.
I randomize the order in which each set of questions is presented to participants (i.e., IAF first or auditors first).
24
The response options were numerically coded such that “Strongly Disagree” = 1 and “Strongly Agree” = 7.
23
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group identification with their IAF and auditors. (See Figure 5 for a summary of hypotheses,
theoretical constructs, and variable measures).
V. RESULTS
5.1 Manipulation Checks
To examine whether participants attended to the IAF reliance manipulation, I asked them
to respond with “yes” or “no” to the question of whether Tango’s IAF assisted Jones Auditors
(Tango’s external auditors) with AR control testing. Eighty-one percent of participants correctly
answered this question in accordance with their reliance condition. Ninety-one percent of
participants correctly identified the estimated misstatement magnitude amount referenced in their
experimental condition. Ninety percent of participants also correctly indicated the approximate
likelihood that a misstatement is not detected according to their experimental condition.
Given the complex nature of internal control assessments (Earley et al. 2008; Bedard and
Graham 2011) and my theoretical predictions, I focus data analyses on participants who attended
to the details of the case and correctly recalled the experimental manipulations (Heppner et al.,
2007). That is, I analyze the results of the 82 participants who attended to and recalled both the
auditor reliance and assessment ambiguity manipulations. There is no statistical difference
between the demographic profiles of the 115 participants who completed all study materials and
the 82 participants who correctly recalled the experimental manipulations (see Table 1). I
compare participants’ demographic profiles across the four experimental conditions. With the
exception of having prior experience practicing public accounting, the demographic profiles of
the participants are the same across conditions.25
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With the exception of Prior Experience in Public Accounting (p = 0.05 two-tailed), mean demographic measures
(see Table 1) are the same across experimental cells (p values > 0.15 two-tailed). I control for Prior Experience in
Public Accounting in all data analyses.
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To investigate whether participants perceived the Less (More) Ambiguous experimental
conditions as being less (more) open to interpretation, I examine participants’ likelihood to
challenge the auditors’ control assessment in these conditions. I expect that participants will be
more willing to challenge auditors’ control assessment when the control assessment process is
perceived to be more ambiguous and more open to interpretation. To this end, I ask participants
to indicate the likelihood that they will “challenge the external auditor’s control assessment of
material weakness.” This rating is measured on a seven-point scale with the first option being
“Very Unlikely” and the seventh option being “Very Likely.”26 I find that participants in the
More Ambiguous condition indicated that they were more likely to challenge the auditor’s
control assessment than participants in the Less Ambiguous condition (5.53 vs. 4.68,
respectively; p = 0.03 one-tailed; not tabled). This finding lends support to the theoretical
development used in this study and also extends accounting research on the ambiguity involved
in assessing internal control deficiencies.
Further analysis finds that participants were manipulated in the Ambiguity conditions by
the differences in “likelihood” parameters but not by the “materiality” parameters. Using a
seven point scale27, participants’ assessment of the likelihood that a misstatement was not
prevented / detected is statistically different between the Ambiguous conditions in keeping with
the intended manipulation (means = 4.37 [more ambiguous] vs. 5.05 [less ambiguous]; p = 0.03
two-tailed; not tabled). However, there is no statistical difference in participants’ assessments
between the two Ambiguity conditions when asked of their perceptions of the materiality of the
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The response options are numerically coded such that “Very Unlikely” = 1 and “Very Likely” = 7.
The response options are numerically coded such that “Very Unlikely” = 1 and “Very Likely” = 7.
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potential AR misstatement28 (means = 4.08 [more ambiguous] vs. 3.75 [less ambiguous]; p =
0.23 two-tailed; not tabled).
5.2 Data Analyses
I find evidence to support H1 which predicts that management has higher group
identification with their IAF than they do with the auditors.29 Specifically, identification ratings
for the IAF are higher than those for the auditor (means = 5.28 vs. 3.71, respectively; p < 0.01
one-tailed; see Table 2).30 On a per question pair basis, I also find that identification ratings for
the IAF are higher than those corresponding to the auditor which lends further support to this
prediction (all p < 0.01; see Table 2). These results suggest that management has greater
identification with their IAF as in-group members than they do with their auditors. I further
investigate whether management identification with their IAF and auditors differ with auditor
reliance on the IAF. Results indicate that auditor IAF reliance does not affect management
identification with their IAF (means = 5.39 [rely] vs. 5.15 [not rely]; p = 0.18 two-tailed; not
tabled). However, I find moderate support that management identifies more with their auditors
when the auditors rely on the client’s IAF than when the auditors do not (mean = 3.93 [rely] vs.
3.47 [not rely]; p = 0.07 two-tailed; not tabled). These results extend Stefaniak et al. (2012) and
add to the accounting literature by providing evidence that management has greater affiliation
with their IAF than their auditors. Further, by relying on the client’s IAF, auditors may be able
to increase management’s identification with them. Research finds that management’s increased
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Participants’ assessments were made on a seven point scale on a scale with 1= Less Material, and 7 = More
Material.
29
The Cronbach’s alpha of the Organizational Identification scale is 0.81 suggesting the set of items in the scale
reliably measures a single unidimensional latent construct.
30
Statistical inferences are unchanged when using the entire pool of 115 participants (means = 5.28 [IAF] vs. 3.66
[auditors]; p < 0.01 one-tailed; not tabled).
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identification with auditors allows auditors to enhance future business relationships with the
client (e.g., Iyer et al. 1997).
H2 predicts that management will be more willing to accept the auditors’ control
assessments when the auditors rely on the company’s IAF than when the auditors do not.
Contrary to my expectations, I do not find evidence that, in general, management is more willing
to accept auditors’ control assessments when auditors rely on their IAF for audit testing
assistance (means = 4.30 [rely] vs. 4.36 [not rely]; p = 0.36 one-tailed; Table 4).31
Based on psychological research on group identification and persuasion (e.g., Mackie et
al. 1992), I expect that management will find audit testing results to be more credible when
auditors rely versus do not rely on the IAF. I find empirical support that management perceives
internal controls testing results to be more credible when auditors rely on their IAF than when
auditors do not. When asked to indicate their agreement with the statement “In your opinion, the
internal controls testing results were credible,”32 participants’ agreement rating was higher when
the auditors relied on the IAF for internal controls testing than when the auditors did not (means
= 5.37 [rely] vs. 4.92 [not rely]; p = 0.03 two-tailed; not tabled). This finding lends support to
the theoretical development of H2.33 Further, these findings provide evidence for the practical
implications of relying on the client’s IAF for audit testing. Relying on the client’s IAF can
improve the credibility of the auditors’ testing results which may enhance communications
between auditors and management. Additional analysis provides evidence that management also
perceives IAF competence to be higher when auditors rely on the IAF for audit testing (means =
31

Additional data analysis support this finding. Employing a chi-square test suggests IAF reliance has a moderate
effect on management’s willingness to accept auditors’ assessments (χ2 [6] = 8.92, p = 0.08 one-tailed). KruskalWallis tests indicate no effect of reliance on managements’ willingness (H[1] = 0.001; p = 0.48 one-tailed).
Similarly, Mann-Whitney tests also indicate that management’s willingness to accept the auditors’ control
assessment does not differ based on auditors’ reliance on the client’s IAF (median = 5.00 [rely] vs. 5.00 [not rely]; U
= 834.50; z = -0.038; p = 0.48 one-tailed; r = -0.004).
32
Using a seven point scale to capture responses where 1 = Strongly Disagree and 7 = Strongly Agree.
33
Inferences for hypotheses testing remained the same after controlling for this Audit Testing Credibility variable.
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5.40 [rely] vs. 4.51 [not rely]; p < 0.01 two-tailed; not tabled) and perceives the IAF to be more
objective when there is auditor IAF reliance (mean = 5.49 [rely] vs. 4.69 [not rely]; p < 0.01 twotailed; not tabled). Notwithstanding, these management perceptions of audit test result
credibility, IAF competence, and IAF objectivity do not alter the effects of auditor IAF reliance
on management’s willingness to accept auditors’ assessments.34
While there is limited support for a main effect of IAF reliance on auditor persuasion,
evidence suggests that management’s willingness to accept auditors’ control assessments is
conditional upon two factors - auditors’ reliance on the client’s IAF as well as the ambiguity
involved in evaluating the control deficiency. I explore this evidence in the evaluation of H3. In
H3, I predict that management will be more persuaded to accept the auditors’ control assessment
when the control assessment is more ambiguous and auditors rely on the IAF than when they do
not. Data suggests that auditors’ likelihood of persuading management is conditional upon
reliance on the client’s IAF and the ambiguity involved in assessing the control deficiency (i.e.,
disordinal interaction between auditors’ reliance on the client’s IAF and control assessment
ambiguity; p = 0.04 one-tailed; Table 4; Figure 6).35 When the evaluation of the control
deficiency is more ambiguous, management is more willing to accept the auditors’ control
assessment when auditors rely on the IAF than when they do not (means = 4.47 vs. 3.84,
respectively; p = 0.10 one-tailed; Table 3). This finding is consistent with prior psychological
studies (e.g., Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994) that find that associations with a perceived in34

Controlling for management’s perception of audit test result credibility, IAF competence, and IAF objectivity do
not change the statistical inference that auditor reliance on IAF does not have a main effect on management’s
willingness to accept auditors’ control assessments ( p = 0.49 one-tailed).
35
Results of an ordinal logistic regression support this finding. The coefficient on the interaction of IAF
Reliance*Ambiguity is 1.25 (positive) and statistically significant (p = 0.05 one-tailed). To provide additional
support for this finding, I examine different configurations of participants who participated in the study. Interaction
results are statistically significant for participants who pass one or more of the experimental manipulations. For
example, participants who pass (1) the IAF Reliance manipulation only (p = 0.04, one-tailed); (2) the IAF Reliance
and “Materiality” manipulations (p = 0.02, one-tailed); (3) both IAF Reliance and the “Likelihood” manipulations (p
= 0.05, one-tailed); (4) both Ambiguity manipulations (p = 0.07, one-tailed).
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group improves the persuasiveness of messages that are more open to interpretation. However,
these persuasiveness effects seem to disappear when the evaluation of the control deficiency is
less open to interpretation. When the evaluation of the control deficiency is less ambiguous,
management appears to be more willing to accept the auditors’ control assessment when auditors
do not rely on the IAF than when they do (means = 4.85 vs. 4.17, respectively; p = 0.10 onetailed; Table 3). These findings suggest that relying on the client’s IAF improves auditors’
likelihood of persuading management to accept an adverse control assessment when the
evaluation of the control is more open to interpretation but not when the evaluation is less open
to interpretation.
Analysis of median values for management’s willingness to accept auditors’ control
assessments sheds more light on the interactive effects of IAF reliance and judgment ambiguity
on the persuasiveness of auditors’ messages. In the more ambiguous condition, test of
differences between Rely and Not Rely median scores provide moderately more support that
relying on the client’s IAF influences management to be more persuaded to accept auditors’
control assessments than not relying on the IAF (medians = 5.00 [rely] vs. 4.00 [not rely], p =
0.12 one-tailed; not tabled). However, in the less ambiguous condition, tests of differences
between Rely and Not Rely median scores suggest that IAF reliance has significantly less effect
on auditor persuasion (medians = 4.00 [rely] vs. 5.00 [not rely], p = 0.43 one-tailed; not tabled).
The pattern of auditor persuasion observed in the Less Ambiguous condition may be due
to a combination of the diminished effects of in-group sources on persuasion as well as
management’s perception of the auditors. Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994) find that when the
message is less ambiguous, the persuasion effects of in-group sources disappear. That appears to
be the case in this setting. That is, when the interpretation of the control deficiency is less
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ambiguous, auditors’ reliance on the IAF does not increase persuasion. In fact, reliance on the
IAF appears to have the opposite effect. That is, management appears to penalize reliance on the
IAF in this setting. Interviews with accounting practitioners suggest that management may
interpret the breakdown in controls in the less ambiguous condition to be of such an obvious
nature that a reasonable IAF would have detected and remediated it before year-end. In this way,
relying on the IAF does not increase persuasion, rather it increases the salience that the IAF did
not find and remediate this “obvious” control deficiency which has now resulted in an adverse
ICFR opinion. Potentially, IAF reliance in a less ambiguous control deficiency environment
may induce management to engage in counterfactual reasoning about the existence of the control
deficiency which may counteract the effects of in-group persuasion. Notwithstanding this
potential explanation, the effects of IAF reliance on management persuasion in less ambiguous
control deficiency settings may be an area for future research.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This study aims to provide evidence regarding auditor reliance on their client’s IAF as a
persuasion tactic. I use psychological theories related to group affiliation and persuasion to
predict that management will have higher identification with their IAF than with auditors and be
more persuaded to accept auditors’ control assessment when auditors rely on their IAF than
when auditors do not. Additionally, I predict that the effects of such persuasion will be greater
when the underlying control deficiency assessment is more open to interpretation. Using a
participant group consisting of accounting professionals with experience performing internal
controls assessments, I find evidence to some of my predictions. Specifically, I find that
management has higher group identification with their IAF than they do with auditors and
perceive control testing results to be more credible when auditors rely on their IAF than when
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auditors do not. Further, management is more willing to accept auditor ascribed control
deficiency assessments when auditors rely on their IAF for control testing and the judgment
involved in evaluating the control deficiency is more conducive to varied interpretations.
However, these persuasive effects disappear when the control assessment is less open to
interpretation. In fact, when the control assessment is less ambiguous, not relying on the client’s
IAF may be a more persuasive tactic for auditors.
These findings also extend prior studies on auditor reliance on the client’s IAF as well as
studies focused on auditor negotiations by providing evidence that relying on the client’s IAF
can enhance auditors’ persuasion abilities in internal control over financial reporting audit
contexts. The persuasive effects of relying on the client’s IAF in settings where the control
assessment is more ambiguous has significant implications for practice as it is likely that
auditors’ internal control assessments will be more challenged during client negotiations when
control deficiency issues are regarded as more open to different interpretations. Where such
contexts may be anticipated, auditors can increase their negotiating leverage by engaging the
client’s IAF in audit testing. Hence, relying on the client’s IAF for direct assistance with audit
testing may aid auditors in having more effective discussions and negotiation exchanges with
their client.
Findings from this study also suggest that auditors can increase management’s
identification with them by relying on the client’s IAF for audit testing. Prior studies find that
when management identifies more with their auditor, they are more likely to engage in future
business dealings with the auditor (Iyer et al. 1997).
This study provides theoretical and practical insights for academics, accounting
regulators and practitioners. While prior research has investigated negotiation factors such as the
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effects of a contentious versus a collaborative negotiation approach (Honglin et al. 2011), a
reciprocity strategy (Bame-Aldred and Kida 2007; Sanchez et al. 2007), integrative versus
distributive strategies (Gibbins et al. 2010), the effects of auditor concessions (Ng and Tan
2003), this study investigates and finds evidence of the effectiveness of using the client’s IAF in
negotiations. This study contributes to this literature by providing evidence that relying on the
client’s IAF can be an effective tool auditors use to persuade management. Greater auditor
persuasion in an internal control over financial reporting context may result in more conservative
financial reporting, greater disclosure of material weaknesses (Lin et al. 2011), and a more
efficient auditing process (Sanchez et al. 2007).

Further, this study provides insights to

standard setters as they prescribe guidance for how auditors utilize the client’s IAF during the
financial statement assurance process.
Future research may investigate the effects of a less ambiguous control assessment
environment on auditors’ likelihood of persuading management. There may be specific
characteristics about such an environment that eliminate the in-group effect on persuasion.
Future studies may also examine other ways in which the coordinating activities with the IAF
may benefit the auditor-client negotiation process e.g., audit planning and risk assessment
activities. Future research may also investigate the effects of in-group persuasion in other
accounting contexts where complex judgments are involved.
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Figure 1.
Graphical Presentation of Judgment Ambiguity Constructs in Material Weakness Control
Deficiency (Points A and B)

A

Materiality
Magnitude

Material

Material
Weakness
Significant
Deficiency

Not material
but significant

B

Deficiency

Not material
or significant

Remote

Reasonably possible or
probable

Likelihood of Misstatement
Judgment Ambiguity Construct Definitions:
AMore ambiguous assessment:
- Marginal likelihood that misstatement is not detected or prevented (25%);
- High magnitude of misstatement materiality (6% of pretax income).
BLess ambiguous assessment:
- High likelihood that misstatement is not detected or prevented (70%);
- Marginal magnitude of misstatement materiality (4.5% of pretax income).
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Figure 2
Illustration of Relative Ambiguity in Assessing “Materiality” versus “Likelihood”
Relative Ambiguity in Assessing
Materiality vs. Likelihood
for
Material Weakness Control Deficiency
Magnitude of
Misstatement:
Material

(High)

Likelihood of
Misstatement
(Probable)

Magnitude of
Misstatement
Open to Interpretation /
Ambiguity
Open to Interpretation
/ Ambiguity
Likelihood of
Misstatement

Magnitude of
Misstatement:
Material /
Significant

(At Margin)

Likelihood of
Misstatement
(Reasonably
Possible / Remote)

Ambiguity in Assessing Materiality Factor of Material Weakness (MW) Control Deficiency
(upper / lighter shaded area):
 As the magnitude of misstatement crosses threshold from Significant to Material (right to
left), ambiguity in assessing MW control deficiency is greater. When magnitude of
misstatement is highest, ambiguity in assessing MW control deficiency is lower.
Ambiguity in Assessing Likelihood Factor of Material Weakness (MW) Control Deficiency
(lower / darker shaded area):
 As the likelihood of misstatement crosses threshold from Remote to Reasonably Possible
(right to left), ambiguity in assessing MW control deficiency is greater. When likelihood
of misstatement is highest, ambiguity in assessing MW control deficiency is lower.
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Figure 3
Graphical Illustration of Theory
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Figure 4
Illustration of Hypothesized Effects
Auditors’ Ability to Persuade Management (dependent variable)
9
8
7
6

5

Rely on IAF

4

Not Rely on IAF

3
2
1
Less Ambiguous
Judgment

More Ambiguous
Judgment

H3 predicts an interaction between auditor reliance on the IAF and the perceived ambiguity of
the control deficiency evaluation on management’s likelihood to be persuaded by the auditors’
control assessment.
Variable Definitions
- Rely on IAF – The external auditors rely on the client’s internal audit function for assistance
with control testing.
- Not Rely on IAF - The external auditors do not rely on the client’s internal audit function for
assistance with control testing.
- Less Ambiguous Judgment – The evaluation of the control deficiency is less ambiguous:
likelihood of detection is marginal and the magnitude of the misstatement is high.
- More Ambiguous Judgment – The evaluation of the control deficiency is more ambiguous:
likelihood of detection is high and the magnitude of the misstatement is marginal.
- Auditors’ Ability to Persuade Management – Likelihood that management will be persuaded
to accept the auditor’s material weakness control assessment.
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Figure 5
Summary of Research Hypotheses, Constructs and Variables
Hypothesis

Independent
Variable Construct

Independent
Variable Measure

H1: Management
will have higher
group
identification
with the IAF than
they will with the
auditors.

Internal Audit
Function (IAF)

Internal Audit
Function (IAF)

External Auditors
(Auditors)

External Auditors
(Auditors)

Dependent
Variable
Construct
Management’s
Identification
with IAF /
Auditors

Dependent Variable
Measure
Agreement with
statement using a seven
point scale:
When someone criticizes
Tango’s internal audit
function / external
auditor, it feels like a
personal insult.
Tango's internal audit
function / external
auditor successes are my
successes.
When I talk about
Tango’s internal audit
function / external
auditor, I usually say
“We” rather than
“They”.
I am very interested in
what others think about
Tango’s internal audit
function / external
auditors.

H2: Management
will be more
persuaded by the
auditors’ control
assessments when
the auditors rely
on the client’s
IAF than when
they do not.

Auditors’ rely or not
rely on the client’s
IAF for control testing
assistance

Rely on IAF: Jones
Auditor
Auditors explains
Persuasion
that they relied on
your in-house IAF to
perform AR controls
testing.
Not Rely on IAF:
Jones Auditors
explains that they
did not rely on your

When someone praises
Tango’s internal audit
function / external
auditors, it feels like a
personal compliment.
Indication of willingness
on a seven point scale:
As Tango’s CFO, how
willing are you to accept
the external auditor’s
control assessment of
“material weakness?”

44

Hypothesis

H3: When the
assessment of the
control deficiency
is more open to
interpretation
(ambiguous),
management will
be more
persuaded to
accept the
auditors’ control
assessment when
the auditors rely
on the client’s
IAF than when
the auditors do
not rely on the
IAF.

Independent
Variable Construct

Independent
Variable Measure

Auditors’ rely or not
rely on the client’s
IAF for control testing
assistance

IAF to perform AR
controls testing.
Rely on IAF: Jones
Auditor
Auditors explains
Persuasion
that they relied on
your in-house IAF to
perform AR controls
testing.
Not Rely on IAF:
Jones Auditors
explains that they
did not rely on your
IAF to perform AR
controls testing.

Ambiguity in
assessment of the
control deficiency

Dependent
Variable
Construct

Dependent Variable
Measure

Indication of willingness
on a seven point scale:
As Tango’s CFO, how
willing are you to accept
the external auditor’s
control assessment of
“material weakness?”

More Ambiguous:
The magnitude of a
possible
misstatement
resulting from this
breakdown in
controls is
approximately 6%
of income before
taxes.
The likelihood that
there is a
misstatement that is
not prevented /
detected, as a result
of this internal
control deficiency, is
estimated at 25%.
Less Ambiguous:
The magnitude of a
possible
misstatement
resulting from this
breakdown in
controls is
approximately 4.5%
of income before
taxes.
The likelihood that
there is a
misstatement that is
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Hypothesis

Independent
Variable Construct

Independent
Variable Measure

Dependent
Variable
Construct

Dependent Variable
Measure

not prevented /
detected, as a result
of this internal
control deficiency, is
estimated at 70%.
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Figure 6
Evidence from Data Collection: H2 and H3
Management’s Willingness to Accept Auditors’ Control Assessment Auditors’ (dependent
variable)
7.00

6.00

5.00

Rely

4.00

Not Rely
3.00

2.00

1.00
Less Ambiguous Judgment

More Ambiguous Judgment

Variable Definitions
- Rely on IAF – The external auditors rely on the client’s internal audit function for assistance
with AR internal control testing.
- Not Rely on IAF - The external auditors do not rely on the client’s internal audit function for
assistance with AR internal control testing.
- Less Ambiguous Judgment – The evaluation of the control deficiency is less ambiguous:
likelihood of detection is high and the magnitude of the misstatement is marginal.
- More Ambiguous Judgment – The evaluation of the control deficiency is more ambiguous:
likelihood of detection is marginal and the magnitude of the misstatement is high.
- Management’s Willingness to Accept the Auditors’ Control Assessment (Dependent
variable): Participants’ response to the following statement “As Tango’s CFO, how willing
are you to accept the external auditor’s control assessment of “material weakness?”
Participants indicate their willingness using a seven-point scale where 1 = Very Unwilling,
4=Neither Unwilling nor Willing, and 7= Very Willing.
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Table 1
Participant Demographics

Demographic

Age (n = 115: range 21 to 72 years)
(n = 82: range 21 to 71 years)
Gender: Male
CPA designation
Prior experience in public accounting
For participants with prior
public accounting experience,
time spent in practice (years)
Prior experience in internal auditing
For participants with prior
internal auditing experience,
time spent in practice (years)
Internal controls experience

All
Participants
Mean
(Standard
deviation)
43
(12)
70%
77%
74%
9.8
(9.6)

Participants in
Data Analyses
Mean
(Standard
deviation)
41
(11)
70%
74%
71%
8.6
(8.2)

t value1

p value2

-0.93

0.35

-0.01
-0.34
-0.49
-0.78

0.99
0.73
0.62
0.43

50%
5.0
(3.6)

52%
5.1
(3.7)

0.27
0.11

0.78
0.91

9.5
(9.2)
9.4
(9.0)
115

9.5
(9.2)
9.5
(9.6)
82

-0.05

0.95

0.07

0.94

Experience discussing financial
statement audit issues with auditors
n
Notes
1 Test of difference between means of 155 participants and 82 participants
2 p value is two-tailed

48

Table 2
Group Identification Scale
Analyzed Data Sample (n=82)
Identification Question a

Internal
External
p-valuec
b
b
Auditors
Auditors
When someone criticizes Tango’s internal audit
4.87
3.17
<0.01
function / external auditor, it feels like a personal
(1.57)
(1.66)
insult.
[7.00]
[7.00]
{1.00}
{1.00}
Tango's internal audit function / external auditor
5.48
3.56
<0.01
successes are my successes.
(1.40)
(1.81)
[7.00]
[7.00]
{1.00}
{1.00}
When I talk about Tango’s internal audit function /
4.98
2.72
<0.01
external auditor, I usually say “We” rather than “They”.
(1.65)
(1.81)
[7.00]
[7.00]
{1.00}
{1.00}
I am very interested in what others think about Tango’s
5.73
5.33
<0.01
internal audit function / external auditors.
(1.04)
(1.30)
[7.00]
[7.00]
{3.00}
{2.00}
When someone praises Tango’s internal audit function
5.37
3.79
<0.01
/ external auditors, it feels like a personal compliment.
(1.45)
(1.61)
[7.00]
[7.00]
{1.00}
{1.00}
Total
5.28
3.71
<0.01
(1.12)
(1.21)
[7.00]
[6.80]
{2.20}
{1.80}
a
Measured on a seven-point scale with 1= “Strongly Disagree” and 7= “Strongly Agree”
b
Mean, (Standard Deviation), [Maximum], {Minimum}
c
p-values are one-tailed.
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Table 3
Variable Descriptive Statistics for Management’s Willingness to Accept
the Auditors’ Control Assessment
Auditor Reliance and Judgment Ambiguity (H2 and H3)
Mean, [Median] and (Standard Deviation)
Management’s Willingness to Accept the Auditors’ Control Assessment 1
Rely on IAF2
Not Rely on IAF3 Total
Less Ambiguous Judgment 4
4.17
4.85
4.48
[4.00]
[5.00]
[5.00]
(1.83)
(1.66)
(1.77)
n = 24
n = 20
n = 44
5
More Ambiguous Judgment
4.47
3.84
4.16
[5.00]
[4.00]
[5.00]
(1.42)
(1.64)
(1.55)
n = 19
n = 19
n = 38
Total
4.30
4.36
[5.00]
[5.00]
(1.65)
(1.70)
n = 43
n = 39
1
Management’s Willingness to Accept the Auditors’ Control Assessment (Dependent
variable): Participants’ response to the following statement “As Tango’s CFO, how willing
are you to accept the external auditor’s control assessment of “material weakness?”
Participants indicate their willingness using a seven-point scale where 1 = Very Unwilling,
4=Neither Unwilling nor Willing, and 7= Very Willing.
2
Rely on IAF – The external auditors rely on the client’s internal audit function for assistance
with AR internal control testing.
3
Not Rely on IAF - The external auditors do not rely on the client’s internal audit function for
assistance with AR internal control testing.
4
Less Ambiguous Judgment – The evaluation of the control deficiency is less ambiguous:
likelihood of detection is high and the magnitude of the misstatement is marginal.
5
More Ambiguous Judgment – The evaluation of the control deficiency is more ambiguous:
likelihood of detection is marginal and the magnitude of the misstatement is high.
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Table 4
Test of Hypothesis H2 and H3
ANOVA of Management’s Willingness to Accept the Auditors’ Control Assessment
Factor
Df
Sum of
F
p-valuea
Squares
Prior Public Accounting Experience
1
7.162
2.65
.05
Reliance on IAF
1
0.32
0.12
.36
Judgment Ambiguity
1
1.11
0.41
.26
Reliance on IAF*Judgment Ambiguity
1
8.42
3.11
.04
Error
77
207.98
Notes
a
p-value is one-tailed
Variable definitions:
As defined in Table 3
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Appendix
Experimental Instrument (Qualtrics online screen shots)
All participants see the Informed Consent screens below.
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Participants who select the option to exit the study are directed to the screen below.

Participants who indicate they would like to continue to the study are directed to the screen
below.

53

Participants who are randomly assigned to the Rely / More Ambiguous condition see the
following screens:

54

55

56

57

Participants who are randomly assigned to the Rely / Less Ambiguous condition see the
following screens:

58

59

60

61

Participants who are randomly assigned to the Not Rely / More Ambiguous condition see the
following screens:

62

63

64

65

Participants who are randomly assigned to the Not Rely / Less Ambiguous condition see the
following screens:

66

67

68

69

All participants see the following screens:
Experimental Questions
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71

72

73

74

75

76

77

End of the study.
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